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JURISDICTION
Appellants Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
(collectively "Larsons") initially appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(3)(j).

The Supreme Court

transferred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S 78-2-3(4).

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The only issue presented by this appeal is whether the
district court erred in dismissing Larsons' complaint as untimely
under the applicable statutes of limitation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court should apply the same analytical standard as
that applied by trial court on a motion for summary judgment and
should review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness.

Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. SS 78-12-25(1) & (3):
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing . . . .

(3) An action for relief not otherwise
provided for by law.
2

Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-26(2):
Within three years:

(2) an action for taking, detaining, or
injuring personal property, including actions
for specific recovery thereof . . . .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b):
(b) How presented. Every defense, in
law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto
if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
. . . If, on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b) & (c):
(b) For defending party. A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on
3

file, together with the affidavits, if anyf
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . .
• •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Larsons filed this action in the Third Judicial

District Court for Salt Lake County on June 24, 1987 alleging
breach of an oral contract, interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and conversion.

Stephen Wade, Bryce Wade, Kipp Wade, dba SBK; and Valley

Ford (collectively "Wades") responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the various claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitation.

The motion to dismiss was based on

the statements in the Larsons' complaint that the actions of the
Wades upon which the various causes of action were based occurred
prior to or concurrent with a specific event —

the filing of a

creditor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy proceeding, In re Larson Ford Sales, Inc., Bankr. No.
82C-02186, before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (hereinafter "Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy").

The

Wades established by affidavit that the filing of the creditor's
plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy
occurred more than four years prior to the date the Larsons
4

commenced their action.

The Larsons filed an affidavit in oppo-

sition that did not controvert the fact that the creditor's plan
of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy was filed
some time prior to June 10, 1983, the date upon which the bankruptcy court confirmed the creditor's plan.

In July 1988, the

court, treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment, dismissed the amended complaint as barred by the applicable statutes of limitation as a matter of law.
The Larsons filed a "Notice of Extension of Time to
Appeal" one day after the expiration of the thirty (30) day
appeal period.
extension.

The district court denied the motion for an

The Larsons appealed the denial of the motion for an

extension to the Utah Supreme Court, which reversed the denial in
an unpublished ruling.

The Larsons thereafter brought this

appeal.
II.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The Larsons filed their complaint on June 24, 1987.

The Larsons filed a First Amended Complaint ("amended complaint")
on July 9, 1987.
2.

R. 11.

The amended complaint alleges four causes of

action:
First Cause of Action —
Second Cause of Action —

Breach of Contract
Interference with Business
Relations
5

Third Cause of Action —

Fourth Cause of Action —

Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
Unjust Enrichment and
Conversion
Punitive Damages.

R. 13-18.
3.

The claims in the amended complaint all arose from

an alleged January 1983 oral agreement between Stephen Wade and
the Larsons in which Wade allegedly agreed to purchase Larson
Ford Sales, which was then in a chapter 11 bankruptcy, from
Walter Larson, and to take certain actions in connection with the
purchase, including filing and obtaining confirmation of a debtor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of reorganization on behalf of
Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy.

Amended complaint, 1111 4 & 5; R.

12-13.
5.

In their second cause of action, the Larsons allege

that after the Wades breached the oral contract, the Wades
tortiously interfered with a contract the Larsons had entered
into with another party to purchase Larson Ford Sales:
Subsequent to the breach of contract by WADE as
set forth in the First Cause the Plaintiffs negotiated
an agreement with a partnership known as HGBH . . . .
(Amended complaint, 11 10);
Defendant STEPHEN WADE, having breached his agreement with Plaintiff, conspired with and induced the
HGBH partnership to breach their contract to provide
like benefits. (Amended complaint, 1111 10 & 13.)
R. 15 (emphasis added).
6

6.

The Larsons' amended complaint states that both the

breach of the oral contract and the interference with business
affairs occurred prior to the submission by the Wades of a creditor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy.
Paragraph 13 of the amended complaint states:

"This breach of

HGBH was induced in order that defendant Stephen Wade could submit a creditor's plan in Chapter XI [sic] bankruptcy."

R. 15.

(emphasis added).
7.

The third cause of action alleges that the Wades

were unjustly enriched and converted personal property of Larson
Ford Sales through a breach of fiduciary duty.

In paragraph 17,

the amended complaint states:
The Defendant having received the confidential
data and information about the operation of LARSON FORD
SALES, INC., did utilize said information such that
based upon a claimed debt of $130.12 did submit a contrary and adversary Plan to the Plaintiff's plan as a
creditors[sic] plan to the bankruptcy court which plan
violated the contractual agreement between Plaintiff
and defendants . . . .
R. 17 (emphasis added).
8.

The remaining fourth cause of action seeking puni-

tive damages for intentional and malicious conduct is based upon
the conduct of the Wades alleged in the first three causes of
action.

R. 17-18.
9.

The Larsons' complaint states that the filing of

the creditor's plan of reorganization was a breach of the oral
7

agreement.

Amended Complaint, f 17; R. 17. The creditor's plan

of reorganization referred to in the amended complaint was filed
by Stephen Wade, Inc. in the early spring of 1988.

Affidavit of

Stephen Wade 113; R. 40-41; Affidavit In Opposition To Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss (hereinafter "Affidavit of Walter Larson") 114;
R. 50.
10.

In support of their motion to dismiss, the Wades

submitted the Affidavit of Stephen Wade.

The affidavit estab-

lished the following facts:
a)

Stephen Wade was president, director and the

principal shareholder of Stephen Wade, Inc.
b)

Stephen Wade, Inc. submitted a creditor's plan

of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy
in early spring of 1983, and on June 1, 1983, submitted
a second amended plan of reorganization;
c)

The bankruptcy court confirmed the second

amended creditor's plan of reorganization on June 10,
1983; and
d)

Notice of confirmation of the creditor's plan

of reorganization submitted by Stephen Wade, Inc. was
mailed to all parties in interest in the Larson Ford
Sales bankruptcy on June 10, 1983.

8

R. 40-41.

12.

In response to the motion to dismiss, the Larsons

did not controvert the fact that the creditor's plan of reorganization was filed in the spring of 1983, or that the bankruptcy
court had confirmed the creditor's plan of reorganization on June
10, 1983.

Instead, the Larsons filed an affidavit to the effect

that Walter Larson did not learn of a breach of the oral agreement until June 24, 1983, that Stephen Wade, Inc. was not a party
to the alleged oral contract, and that Larson only learned of the
disappearance of collateral pledged on Larsons' SBA loan

eigh-

teen months after June 24, 1983. R. 49-50.
13.

The district court treated the motion to dismiss

as a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion,

holding that on the undisputed facts, plaintiff's claims were
barred by the statute of limitations as a matter of law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When a complaint on its face alleges that the causes of
action arose prior to a specific date that would make the claims
time barred under applicable statutes of limitations, summary
judgment is appropriate.

The allegations contained in the

Larsons' amended complaint, on their face, state that any breach
of the alleged oral contract or tortious conduct by the Wades
occurred prior to or concurrent with the filing of a creditor's
plan of reorganization in the Larsons Ford Sales bankruptcy.
9

The

Wades established the uncontroverted fact that the creditor's
plan of reorganization was filed sometime before June 10, 1983,
which was more than four years prior to the date the Larsons
filed their complaint.

The amended complaint specifically states

that the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization was a
breach of the contract, and also repeatedly states that the oral
contract was breached sometime prior to the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization.

The statute of limitations did not

commence running from the date the Larsons' claim to have discovered any breach of the agreement or the alleged tortious conduct,
but from the date of the breach or intentional tort, which was no
later than June 10, 1983.
A statute of limitations for intentional torts such as
those alleged in the Larsons' amended complaint begins to run
with the tort or activity leading to the damage, not upon the
occurrence of the last injury or damage.

The statute of limita-

tions begins to run on a tort arising directly from a contractual
relationship at the time the contract was breached.
The Wades did not waive their right to assert a statute
of limitations defense by filing a motion to dismiss.

The motion

to dismiss and supporting memorandum specified the statutes on
which the Wades relied and clearly placed the Larsons on notice.
Finally, the bankruptcy pleadings from 1983 that the Larsons
10

failed to place in the record before the trial court are not relevant.

The complaint's plain allegations state that the causes

of action arose prior to or concurrent with the filing of the
creditor's plan of reorganization, which, by undisputed evidence,
was sometime prior to June 10, 1983. The claims are barred under
applicable statutes of limitation.
ARGUMENT
I.

ACCORDING TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE LARSONS' OWN COMPLAINT,
THE CONDUCT UPON WHICH THEY BASE THEIR CLAIMS OCCURRED NO
LATER THAN THE TIME OF FILING THE CREDITOR'S PLAN OF
REORGANIZATION.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on

the first cause of action for breach of the oral agreement
because the alleged conduct occurred more than four years prior
to the filing of the Larsons' complaint.

Any such claim is

time-barred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(1).
When a complaint alleges that the conduct upon which
its various claims are based all occurred before a specific date
which is outside the limitations period, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Commercial Equity Corporation v.

Majestic Savings and Loan Association, 620 P.2d 56 (Colo. App.
1980) (summary judgment upheld where complaint alleged that conduct giving rise to wrongful foreclosure, tortious interference
with contract, conversion and other claims occurred prior to specific date outside limitations period).
11

In the instant case, the

conduct upon which each of the claims was based is alleged to
have occurred prior to or concurrently with the filing of a creditor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy.

It is an undisputed fact that the creditor's plan was

confirmed on June 10, 1983, establishing that plaintiffs' claims
arose more than four years prior to June 24, 1987, the date the
Larsons commenced this action.
A.

The Filing Of The Stephen Wade, Inc. Creditor's Plan Of
Reorganization Breached The Oral Agreement.
The Larsons' attempt to circumvent the statute of limi-

tations by arguing that Stephen Wade, Inc., the proponent of the
creditor's plan, was not a party to the oral agreement.

Brief of

Appellant at 11. The first amended complaint belies the Larsons'
argument that the Stephen Wade, Inc. plan was not a breach of the
alleged oral agreement.

Paragraph 17 of the amended complaint

states that the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization
"violated the contractual agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants."

R. 17.

It is clear from both the complaint and Walter

Larson's affidavit that the Larsons viewed the filing of a creditor's plan of reorganization by Stephen Wade, Inc., an entity
which Stephen Wade controlled as president, director, and principal shareholder, (R. 40), as a breach of the oral agreement.
The Larsons argue that the Wades are required to show
that the plan of reorganization breached the oral contract and
12

the omission of the plan from the record is therefore "curious."
(Appellant's Brief at 12.)

The Larsons conveniently forget that

their own complaint states emphatically that creditor's plan
"violates the contractual agreement between plaintiff and defendants."

R. 17. The contention on page 12 of Larsons' brief to

that the plan might not be a breach totally flies in the face of
what Larsons alleged in their own complaint.
The Larsons seem to forget that their complaint admitted the facts upon which the district court based its ruling.
Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings , depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits" show there is no material
issue of fact.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(emphasis added).

Parties

are bound by the allegations or admissions of their pleadings.
Dailev v. Barnhart, 768 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla. App. 1988).

A spe-

cific allegation in a complaint is a judicial admission of the
fact alleged.

Kula v. Karat, Inc.. 91 Nev. 100, 531 P.2d 1353,

1356 (1975); Taylor v. Pearl, 249 Or. 611, 439 P.2d 7 (1968).
Furthermore, the confirmation of the Stephen Wade, Inc.
creditor's plan was, as a matter of law, a breach of the alleged
oral contract.

The Larsons' argument that Stephen Wade, individ-

ually, could have performed under the oral contract subsequent to
confirmation of the Stephen Wade, Inc. creditor's plan
13

(Appellant's Brief at 12) has no basis in law.

The Bankruptcy

Code provides that "the court may confirm only one plan."
1129(c).

Id. S

The fact that Stephen Wade, individually, allowed a

creditor's plan to be confirmed in contravention of his alleged
contractual obligation to obtain confirmation of a debtor's plan,
was a breach of the oral agreement.
The confirmation of the Stephen Wade, Inc. plan was a
breach for the additional reason that Stephen Wade was the controlling person of that entity.

Where a party, by a voluntary

act, by his own conduct, causes failure of performance, the party
has breached the agreement.

See Cannon v. Stevens School of

Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977).

As president,

principal shareholder, and director of Stephen Wade, Inc. (R.
40), Stephen Wade, individually, had control over the acts of his
corporation.

Stephen Wade, Inc.'s obtaining confirmation of a

bankruptcy plan of reorganization was, therefore, an action in
the control of Stephen Wade, which made performance of his obligations under the contract impossible.

There is therefore no

question that if there was such a contract, Stephen Wade breached
it no later than June 10, 1983.

14

B.

Whatever Its Nature, The Breach Of The Oral Contract
Occurred Prior To The Date Of Filing The Creditor's
Plan Of Reorganization.
As stated above, the Larsons' argument that the filing

of Stephen Wade, Inc.'s creditor's plan of reorganization was not
a breach of contract is inconsistent with the statements in the
complaint that the filing was a breach.

Further, the Larsons'

contract claims are also barred because the Larsons' complaint
repeatedly states that the Wades breached the oral contract prior
to the submission of the creditor's plan of reorganization in the
Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy.
Paragraph 4(d) of the amended complaint states that the
January 1983 oral agreement for the purchase and acquisition of
Larson Ford Sales required the Wades to file and obtain approval
of a debtor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales
bankruptcy:
(d) Defendants agreed to submit on behalf of
LARSON FORD SALES, a debtor's plan in the Chapter XI
Bankruptcy and obtain approval thereof at no cost to
WALTER P. LARSON. Such plan to include payment of
$175,000.00 to WALTER P. LARSON.
R. 12 (emphasis added).
Paragraph 10 of the amended complaint states that
,f

[subsequent to the breach of contract by WADE as set forth in

the First Cause, the Plaintiffs negotiated an agreement with a
partnership known as HGBH . . . ."
15

R. 15 (emphasis added).

The

Larsons then allege that "Defendant STEPHEN WADE, having breached
his agreement with the Plaintiff, conspired with and induced the
HGBH partnership to breach their contract to provide like benefits.

This breach of HGBH was induced in order that the Defen-

dant STEPHEN WADE could submit a creditor's plan in Chapter XI
Bankruptcy."

Amended complaint, 11 13; R. 15 (emphasis added).

The date of confirmation of the creditor's plan of reorganization
therefore becomes a reference point prior to which time the
alleged conduct giving rise to the Larsons' claims must have
occurred.
On its face, the complaint states that the breach
occurred prior to the submission of the creditor's plan.

The

uncontroverted fact that the creditor's plan of reorganization
proposed by Stephen Wade, Inc. was confirmed on June 10, 1983
(and the date notice was mailed to all interested parties),
leaves no doubt that the alleged breach of contract occurred
sometime prior to June 10, 1983.

Thus, the breach of contract

claim is barred under Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(1).
C.

The Larsons' Tort Claims Are Also Time Barred Because
The Facts Alleged Occurred More Than Four Years Prior
To The Date Of The Larsons' Complaint.
The claims for tortious interference with business

relations, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and conversion contained in the Larsons' second and third causes of
16

action are barred by the four year statute of limitations of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).-

The Larsons allege in paragraph 13 of

the amended complaint that Stephen Wade "conspired with and
induced the HGBH partnership to breach their contract to provide
like benefits.

This breach of HGBH was induced in order that the

Defendant STEPHEN WADE could submit a creditor's plan in Chapter
XI Bankruptcy." R. 15 (emphasis added).

This conduct, by

Larsons' own admission (see supra at 13), all occurred prior to
the June 10, 1983, confirmation date.
The Larsons' breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims are also barred based upon the allegations of the complaint.

The amended complaint states that "in

the process of and concurrent with negotiations involved in the
contract referred to in the first cause of action herein, the
plaintiff made available to the defendant confidential data and
information in order that the defendant could formulate and provide a debtor-in-possession plan for the Larson Ford Sales Chapter XI plan of reorganization."

Amended Complaint, 11 15 (empha-

sis added). (R. 16). The Larsons then allege that the Wades

i/

While the court below based its dismissal of all claims on a
four year statute of limitations, the three year limitation
of § 78-12-26(2) applies to the conversion and unjust
enrichment claims. This point makes no difference in this
case because the Larsons' claims arose more than four years
prior to the commencement of the case.
17

breached the fiduciary duty by utilizing the confidential information to "submit a contrary and adversary Plan to the Plaintiff's plan" to unjustly enrich the Wades and convert the
Larsons' property.

Amended Complaint, If 17; R. 17. These claims

are therefore based upon conduct which occurred at the time of
submission of the creditor's plan of reorganization.

The claims

are barred under the four year statute of limitations of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25.
D.

The Larsons' Punitive Damages Claim Is Time Barred.
The punitive damages claim for intentional and mali-

cious conduct alleged in the Larsons' fourth cause of action is
based upon the same conduct as the first three causes of action.
R. 17-18.

The claim therefore is barred by Utah Code Ann. SS

78-12-25 and 78-12-26.
II.

THE AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER LARSON DOES NOT CREATE MATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT.
The Larsons argue that they are entitled to four infer-

ences from the affidavit of Walter Larson.
13-14.

Appellants' Brief at

None of the "inferences" reasonably arise from the Walter

Larson Affidavit (R. 49-50) or the pleadings.

One cannot reason-

ably infer that the Stephen Wade, Inc. creditor's plan of reorganization did not breach the alleged oral agreement when the
amended complaint states that it did.
R. 17.)

(Amended Complaint, H 17;

Likewise, the Larsons are not entitled to an inference
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that the alleged contract was not breached until June 24, 1983
when there are numerous statements in their amended complaint
that the breach occurred prior to the filing of the creditor's
plan of reorganization.
15-16.)

(Amended Complaint, HH 10, 13 & 15; R.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the pleadings, the

affidavit of Walter Larson, or elsewhere in the record that could
support an inference that the Wades wanted Larson to have no
knowledge of any breach because of doubts as to whether Stephen
Wade, Inc. could proceed with its plan of reorganization.
cursory affidavit of Walter Larson speaks for itself.

The

Walter

Larson does not even address the date of any breach of conduct
or tortious conduct, only the date he discovered it.
Incredibly, the Larsons argue in their brief that
"[t]he only overt act of any party to the contract alleged in
this suit is the order evicting Walter P. Larson from the premises of the Larson Ford dealership."

Appellants' Brief at 14.

The Larsons cannot sweep aside the numerous allegations of overt
acts and breach of contract in their amended complaint as discussed in Part IA above.
No issue of fact arises from the statement in Walter
Larson's affidavit that the creditor's plan of reorganization was
filed by Stephen Wade, Inc., who was not a party to the alleged
contract.

Brief of Appellant at 13-14.
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The statement does not

contradict the Wades' position, and is, in fact, consistent with
the affidavit of Stephen Wade filed in support of the motion to
dismiss.

R. 41.

As discussed in Section IA above, the Larsons'

argument that Stephen Wade, Inc.'s filing a creditor's plan of
reorganization could not have been a breach of the oral agreement
ignores the specific statement,in paragraph 17 of the amended
complaint (R. 17) that filing the creditor's plan was a breach.
Further, whatever the nature of the breach of the alleged agreement, the Larsons' are bound by the numerous statements in their
complaint that the conduct giving rise to the claims occurred
prior to the date the creditor's plan of reorganization was
filed.
The statement in Walter Larson's affidavit that he
first learned of a breach of the oral agreement on June 24, 1983,
and that Larson did not learn that the SBA loan collateral completely disappeared until eighteen (18) months later, does not
create material issues of fact.

Mere ignorance of the existence

of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute
of limitations.

Briqham Young University v. Paulsen Construction

Company, 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987).

Moreover, the Larsons' com-

plaint would have been untimely even if the the so-called "discovery" rule applied to an action for breach of an oral contract:
The discovery rule has no application when an action
easily could have been filed between the date of
discovery and the end of the limitation period.
20

Id, at 1374c

Walter Larson's affidavit indicates that he was

fully aware of all of his claims more than two and one-half years
before the expiration of the four year statutes of limitation.
The fact that Walter Larson's affidavit indicated that
some of the damage from the alleged tortious conduct may not have
occurred until sometime in 1984 does not create a material issue
of fact with respect to the commencement of the statute of limitations.

The statute of limitations in the case of a willful,

intentional tort begins to run with the tort or activity leading
thereto, not when the injured party can ascertain the damages.
See Obrav v. Malmberq, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971)
(damages resulting from an intentional tort need not be shown,
except nominally, for statute of limitations to commence running).

According to the Larsons' own statements, the Wades'

tortious conduct occurred prior to the submission of that creditor's plan.

The undisputed facts are that Stephen Wade, Inc.

first submitted a creditor's plan of reorganization in the spring
of 1983.

The creditor's plan was confirmed June 10, 1983.

It

is clear from the undisputed facts that the conduct complained of
occurred more than four years prior to June 24, 1987.
Even if the complaint did not specifically state that
the tortious conduct occurred more than four years prior to the
Larsons' filing their complaint, the claims would still be barred
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by the statute of limitations.

Many courts hold that when a tort

claim arises directly from a contractual relationship, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the contract was
breached.

Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 789 P.2d 567,

572 (Mont. 1990).

The rationale for the rule is as follows:

First, the breach itself is actionable and it encourages the party to act within [the period of limitations] of an actionable breach rather than to delay
until damages increase. The rule also recognizes that
plaintiff has chosen to deal with the defendant and
that a contract may be stated in terms to minimize
losses from defective performance.
Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 43 111.
App. 3d 765, 357 N.E. 2d 621, 624 (1976), aff'd sub nom West
American Insurance Co. v. Sal E Lobianco & Son Co., 69 111.2d
126, 370 N.E.2d 804 (1977).
The torts alleged by the Larsons arose directly from
the alleged contractual relationship with the Wades.

As dis-

cussed above, the statute of limitations for breach of the oral
contract commenced running prior to June 10, 1983.

The statute

of limitations for the torts alleged in the second and third
causes of action also commenced running prior to June 10, 1983,
and had therefore run prior to June 24, 1987, the date the
Larsons filed their action.
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III. THE LIMITATIONS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT.
The Larsons1 argument that the Larsons should have been
required to answer by reason of Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) and 9(h) is
without merit.

The purpose of the requirement in Rule 9(h) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that a responsive pleading
specify the statute of limitations upon which a party relies is
to give the opposing party adequate notice.

In the instant case,

the memorandum supporting the Wades' motion specified the Wades'
theory and applicable statutes. The Larsons cannot claim that
they were not apprised of the statutory provisions upon which the
Wades based their defense.

Rule 8(c) requires a defendant to

specify affirmative defenses when answering.

The Wades have yet

to even file an answer and therefore, are not subject to waiver
arguments under Rules 8(c) and 12(h).—2/
In addition, the trial court treated the Wades motion
as a motion for summary judgment to be "disposed of as provided

A defendant who answers but fails to include an affirmative
defense waives the defense and may not assert it later.
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah
1983); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Pratt v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d
294, 298 (Utah 1977) aff'd on reh'g, 569 P.2d 1112 (1977).
See also W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d
264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970)(defendant who filed answer not
raising statute of frauds could not do so through motion).
The Wades cannot have waived their limitations defense
because they have yet to file an answer.
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in Rule 56".

Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Rule 56(b) permits a

defendant to file a motion for summary judgment "at any time",
even prior to answering.

^Id. 56(b).

Even if the district court

had not treated the Wades' motion as one for summary judgment,
the Larsons hypertechnical procedural argument should not prevail.

Courts in several jurisdictions allow defendants who have

not answered to raise statute of limitations defenses by motion.
E.g., Dicenso v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 131 Ariz. 605, 643
P.2d 701 (1982); Beckman v. Chamberlain, 673 P.2d 480 (Mont.
1983).

Wright & Miller also state that the rules should be

construed to allow a party to move to dismiss based on the
statute of limitations:
[T]he courts appear to be wise in overlooking formal
distinctions between affirmative defenses and motions,
which have their primary justification in history
rather than logic.
5 Wright & Miller, Federal Civil Procedure S 1277 (1990 ed.).
The Larsons cannot seriously contend that the Wades
waived their statute of limitations defense by filing a motion
attacking the sufficiency of the complaint.
elevates form over substance.

Such an argument

The district court's order should

be affirmed.
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IV.

THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE CREDITOR'S PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
IS NOT RELEVANT.
The Larsons have asked the court to "supplement" the

record on appeal to introduce pleadings from the Larson Ford Sale
bankruptcy.

On February 13, 1991, the court denied the motion to

supplement the record without prejudice.

The Larsons argue that

the Wades did not introduce the bankruptcy papers because they
would create a question of fact.—3/ As discussed in point I
above, according to the Larsons' own statements in their amended
complaint, the submission of the creditor's plan "violated the
contract."

Amended Complaint 1117; R. 17. Thus, the breach of

contract and tortious conduct occurred prior to or concurrent
with the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization

The

effective date of the plan and its implementation are not relevant.

The Larsons' claims are barred by the statutes of limita-

tion because the creditor's plan of reorganization was submitted
or filed, and also confirmed, more than four years prior to the
Larsons initiating their action.
CONCLUSION
The facial allegations of the complaint, coupled with
the uncontroverted fact that the creditor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy was confirmed June 10,

3/

The Larsons offer no explanation for their own failure to
submit the bankruptcy papers to the district court.
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1983, establish as a matter of law that the claims asserted by
the Larsons are barred by the statutes of limitation.

The court

should affirm the district court's order.
DATED this

QA ^ ^ V V day of February, 1991.

Jer7
^
Douglas J^ Payne
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Respondents
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